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Ignoring Ground Description 
Barney G. Glaser, PhD, Hon PhD 
Why is there so much grounded description? The simplest, direct answer is that to many a researcher 
this is GT. This view is supported by several factors. It is easy and natural to describe accurately. So 
slipping into grounded description comes naturally and is ok as GT. Also departmental support for 
description is strongly supported by perspective and academic rewards and history and routine QDA. 
Also many researchers and readers of research cannot conceptualize very well if at all. They want 
accurate description about the data in the study. They are not into taking a core category as a general 
category applicable to general implications applicable to much data elsewhere. Their study is about 
explaining processes the data, NOT in studying the implications of core and sub-core categories as 
they are integrated into an explanatory theory. I trust the reader can think of other sources of letting 
GT research slip into conceptual description. 
Another major source of ignoring detailing no conceptual description when doing GT is the write up of 
the methodology for doing GT in the many books now written on doing GT and its procedures. The 
reader is not warned of the possibility of slipping from the prospect of doing good conceptual GT into 
the grab of doing extensive conceptual grounded descriptions. Conceptual description is assumed as 
GT. For example in Holton and Walsh’s new excellent book (Classic GT 2015, Sage) they have a 
chapter entitled “Discovering New Theory as the End Purpose of Classic GT.” They state immediately 
that “developing is what we are meant to do” doing GT. They then devote ten pages complete with 
charts and diagrams explaining different types of theory. It is too complex and abstract to follow for 
designing a theory for a GT. Not once do they warn the reader about the slipping of conceptual into 
extensive description of a grounded concept. They talk of grounding concept with no illustration of 
data source, which is the opposite of giving too much data. Mild illustration dosage stops excessive 
conceptual description in writing the final product. Having a mild illustration dosage design prevents 
excessive conceptual description take over. 
In another chapter on analyzing data (chapter six) they again do not warn of excessive conceptual 
description. They talk quite correctly that GT depends on the conceptualization of data by coding and 
memoing. They refer to the several incidents used as interchangeable indicators when using the 
constant comparative method to generate and discover conceptual codes. But they do not warn of 
writing about all the interchangeable indicators yielding a concept. This, of course, results in 
excessive conceptual description to no benefit to generating a conceptual GT. The excessive writing 
of incidents just describes the grounding of the GT over and over. It slips the theory into description, 
and loses the conceptual level of a GT, while still calling it a GT. Telling one incident as an illustration 
of a concept/code is enough. Discovering a latent pattern is exciting and it is hard to not describe it at 
length and easy to miss not relating it to other concepts to generate a conceptual theory. Holton and 
Walsh do come close to citing the grounded conceptual description problem when they say 
“description captures a moment in time. But the essentially limited nature of descriptive writing hinders 
the theory’s ability to produce a complex yet parsimonious multivariate abstract theory”. Thus hinders 
theoretical explanations of the latent patterns in the data. Description takes over. The warning is but a 
step away and very important to highlight. Again the natural need to describe a length and the 
tremendous prevalence of description in academic research forces disattending the take over of 
conceptual description to the loss of GT. As Holton and Walsh say, “Concepts remain buried amid 
detailed empirical accounts and it is difficult if not impossible to see the simple elegance in the 
relationship between concepts that together integrate a GT and provide its explanatory power.” 
  
In their current book (Rediscovering Grounded Theory, 2014) Gibson and Hartman devote 21 pages 
to an elegant chapter on the philosophy, perspective and use of codes, that is concepts. Yet due to 
their lack of experience in actually doing GT research, they do not mention slipping from concept into 
description thus losing the theory involved. They see codes or concepts as necessary for theory, but 
they do not warn about slipping from the concept level back to empirical description level by 
excessive illustration of the data that grounded the code. Their chapter 9 on rediscovering coding is 
20 excellent pages relating data to codes, yet there is no mention of excessive description of the data 
used to ground a code for a theory. When extensive description is done it is considered GT without 
realization that the GT has slipped into lengthy description. When doing GT we all can make this 
mistake inadvertently still in 2016. Hopefully that paper will correct this slippage. 
My book Theoretical Sensitivity (1978) deals extensively with substantive coding pages 55 to 82. I 
introduce the chapter by saying coding releases the abstract analysis from the empirical bond of the 
data. Coding allows the researcher to transcend the empirical nature of the data, which is so easy to 
get lost in, while at the same time trying to account for abstract patterns in the data. The abstract 
conceptual view of data was there, but lost in actualizing research procedures. Thus I saw the 
problem in 1978, but I neglected to say careful to not reinstitute the data bond back to the empirical 
level by excessive illustration of the code using a lot of interchangeable indicators. I do say later in the 
chapter to keep code illustrations down to a bare minimum. It is clear that I almost saw the problem of 
conceptual description but missed it and thus did not warn my readers. 
For the researcher who finds himself doing conceptual description her/his decision or choice is clear. 
Does he stop and do GT methodology carefully and not use excessive description Or does he 
continue to do a conceptual description with a QDA methodology? Either is quite acceptable generally 
speaking. Of course academic department perspective plays a role in the decision, but logically 
neither is better than the other. A rhetorical wrestle between the two methodologies to favor one over 
the other is a waste of time. Both are quite respectable (see Choosing GT, by Barney G. Glaser, 
2014). It is a simple choice depending on what the researcher wants and what his department will 
accept for a PhD thesis. A choice must be made to keep the methodology decided on clear. No 
choice and continuing conceptual description results in a jumbled report. Open substantive 
conceptual coding goes anywhere out of control when not in control by a GT procedure. Is the search 
for more concepts or more data indicating a concept becomes the question for the researcher and his 
readers. 
